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ABSTRACT 
 
Network breaches are happening at a phenomenal scale. The unabated exponential 
level is forcing enterprise systems to scramble for solutions since the world is so 
interconnected and digitized and the internet knows no boundaries. Due to big data 
explosion, the platform for attackers to work continues to grow. Most breached 
entities are not aware that they have been compromised for weeks but finds out 
after an external audit or a third party notifies the organizations. Since most 
networks will be breached at some point, it is proper to note that legacy platforms 
will no longer stand a chance to defend against the signature-less attacks. This 
study will create threat awareness, find out capabilities of threat actors, their 
motivations and objectives and identify best practices. 
 
KEYWORDS: Breaches, Exploits, Network Security, Threats, Vulnerabilities.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Enterprise systems have high value information that are valuable and vital to its 
existence and survival.  The battleground is defined. In today’s networked inter-
connectivity, more than 500,000 new malware variants surface on a regular basis. 
Most of these are polymorphic malware and are cryptic to bypass latest detection 
tools in the market [Gallagher, 2014; Weimer, 2014] 
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As cyber exploitations become more sophisticated, cyber espionage become the 
“digital gold” for hackers. Breaches exact expensive toll on victims, in terms of 
money and time. These costs often do not appear as line items on enterprise 
financial statements. The reason could be that the costs are often indirect, 
resulting in wasted resources and missed opportunities. The average data breach 
cost U.S. organizations approximately $6.5 million [4]. This estimates cost 
include but not limited to costs incurred in detecting, responding and mitigating to 
a breach.  Time lost is a concern as organizations analyze attacks coming from 
malicious insiders, malicious codes, and web-based attacks, denial of service, 
stolen devices, phishing, social engineering, malware, botnets, virus, worms and 
Trojans [Clover 2014; Greenburg 2014].   
 
Breaches in 2015, witnessed a growing number of disruptive attacks from foreign 
actors. Some of these attacks came from Crypto Locker who hold data for ransom 
and threaten to release, delete, damage, add malicious code to a sources code 
repository [Vaughan, 2015].  
 
Advanced Persistence Threats [APTs] are escalating to a magnitude unheard in 
the past.  These threats have been a nuisance in the cyber world and have been 
very daunting. Advanced exploits are routinely used to penetrate perimeter 
defenses by circumventing signature based anti-virus technologies and 
compromising endpoints and servers.  Several entities have expressed difficulties 
detecting and identifying these layers because of the stealthy nature of the threats. 
Advanced threats are normally well organized and are formidable adversary that 
target specific goals for exploitations.  Enterprise systems, nation states and 
individuals exploited by advanced threats are at the receiving end of a military 
attack and should mitigate the risk to avoid unrecoverable damages [Schmidt et.al 
2012].  
 
Some of the most potent weapons used by cyber actors include the following, 
Zero-day, APT Tactic, Zeus Trojan [Zbot], Stuxnet, Malicious Computer Worm, 
Duqu, Flame, RATs [Remote Access Trojan], GhOst RAT, Shell Shock also 
known as Bashdoor. Exploitation of software vulnerabilities give access to 
attackers by enabling them to bypass security perimeter. These mentioned threats 
are examples of anomalies that are very difficult to detect by the signature 
detection baseline tools. The concern behind these anomalies is that there are no 
immediate patch mechanisms for early detection in real time that the breached 
organization may implement to prevent systems and network from becoming 
victims [Gallagher 2014; Weimer, 2014]. 
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Stuxnet as mentioned earlier is a worm designed to target only specific Siemens 
SCADA (industrial control) systems. This worm utilizes an unprecedented four 
zero-day vulnerabilities attack tool that make use of a security vulnerability in a 
targeted application, before the vulnerability is exposed to security experts. This 
family of worm uses rootkits advanced techniques to obscure itself from users and 
anti-malware software that it attacks [Smith, 2014].  
 
Signature oriented polymorphic malware is harmful, destructive to a network.  
Examples of these are the Virus, Worm, Regin, Watering Hole attack, Trojan or 
Spyware that constantly changes ("morphs") that makes it difficult to detect with 
anti-malware programs. These are problem areas to a network. 
 
In 2015, the cyber environment, outlined the data breach suffered by some major 
global and national entities.  The breach at Target Corporation that involved theft 
of over 45 million individuals’ records, was surpassed months later when Home 
Depot suffered the loss of 58 million customers’ information.  Organizational 
leaders are concerned about the impact of a breach, the legal implications and 
consequences and the toll to organizational reputation, but are striving to have all 
the right information to make the best possible choices [Vaughan, 2015].   
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Gorman et.al, [2014], in their study, it was noted that when an advanced attacker 
seeks to infiltrate an exploit, it follows a sophisticated, well-coordinated and 
defined process that enables it to leverage its skills effectively and avoid 
detection. Their study concludes that organizations should understand the Cyber 
Kill Chain in order to get inside the minds of advanced threats while engaging in 
intelligence-driven network defense.  
 
[Sweeney, 2013; Ashford, 2012], among others, cited that the “Cyber Kill Chain” 
process is an effective way of understanding the highly orchestrated, technically 
and sophisticated activities of advanced threats life cycle.  
 
[Clayton, 2012; Zetter, 2011] in their report stated that the Flash Player zero-day 
vulnerability whose existence was brought to the surface by Adobe has been 
exploited by a relatively new advanced persistent threat (APT) group named by 
Kaspersky Lab “ScarCruft.”.  Further, that “Scar Cruft” was been observed 
targeting Russia, Nepal, South Korea, China, Kuwait, India and Romania. The 
researchers concludes stating that the group used two Flash Player and one 
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Microsoft Windows vulnerabilities in its attacks. 
 
[Williams, 2011; Rapid Report, 2012], in their reports suggested that, the Flash 
zero-day (CVE-2016-4171), which Adobe plans on patching, has been used by the 
threat actors in a campaign dubbed “Operation Daybreak.” The campaign, 
launched in March 2016, has focused on high-profile targets. 
 
A study by [FireEye, 2012; Goldman, 2012], among others, found that Russian 
and Chinese hackers have been penetrating the computer network of the United 
States government to access database of confidential secret service documents for 
potential espionage. 
 
In another report by [Hosenball, 2012], it was found that Chinese hackers were 
behind U.S. ransomware attacks - using tactics and tools previously associated 
with Chinese government-supported computer network intrusions.  Ransomware, 
which involves encrypting a target's computer files and then demanding payment 
to unlock them, has generally been considered the domain of run-of-the-mill 
cyber criminals.   
Ponemon Institute, in its global analysis of 2016 cost of Data Breach study, found 
that the average total cost of a data breach for the 383 companies participating in 
their research increased from $3.79 to $4 million. It was also found that the 
average cost paid for each lost or stolen record containing sensitive and 
confidential information increased from $154 in 2015 to $158 in 2016. Also, that 
organizations in Brazil and South Africa are most likely to have a material data 
breach involving 10,000 or more records, in contrast to organizations in Germany 
and Australia that are least likely to experience a material data breach [Ponemon 
Institute Research Report, 2016]. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Survey questionnaires were designed and distributed to IT security professionals 
at a technology security conference, in Orlando Florida in 2015. The goal is to 
examine and understand the patterns and behavior of cyber actors on various 
networks.  
 
The survey participants are IT professionals that are employed in network 
environment and handle cyber security concerns, involving network security, and 
have extensive years of experience in the field. These folks are network 
administrators, security consultants, or senior security executives. The companies 
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under study represent mid-size and large organizations. These professionals 
conduct research and publish white papers on cyber-security matters 
 
The sample population comprises of 249 participants. All were randomly selected. 
The survey had a total of 11 questions, using Likert scales tool that ranged from 5 
(“mostly concerned”) to 1 (“do not know”) on rating questions regarding security 
threats, and categorical  yes/no questions for gender and IT position ranks. The 
purpose of the questionnaire was to assess the concerns of IT professionals and 
researchers on security related issues at their respective organizations 
 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
The present study analyzes the responses from participants based on their gender 
and rank in the organization, regarding their perceptions to security effectiveness, 
IDS, Hackers, employees foreign, and third party vendors.  Number of all 
participants in each survey question is shown below table 1. SPSS software used 
for data analysis, a total of 7 hypotheses are analyzed. Independent samples t tests 
are used for data analysis, the t test was used since the F test for testing equality of 
variance in any given pair of samples was not significant. 
 
 
Table 1. Part I:  Statistics for all Participants in each Survey Question   
 Gender Administration Security Effectiveness IDS Hackers 
N Valid 245 243 244 244 244 245 
Missing 4 6 5 5 5 4 
 
 
Table 1- Part II:  Statistics for all Participants in each Survey 
 Employees Foreign Vendors 
N Valid 245 245 245 
Missing 4 4 4 
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GENDER 
 
Gender was examined, there is total of 249 participants in this survey, 168 are 
male and 77 are female as it is illustrated below in table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Gender Participants in the Survey Questionnaire 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Male 168 67.5 68.6 68.6 
Female 77 30.9 31.4 100.0 
Total 245 98.4 100.0  
Missing System 4 1.6   
Total 249 100.0   
 
 
ADMINISTRATION 
 
HO: There is no difference in perspective between Executive /Senior IT 
Administration and lower-level IT personal regarding the network security 
systems and other related issues.    
 
Ha: There is difference in perspective between Executive / Senior IT 
Administration and lower-level IT personal regarding the network security 
systems and other related issues.   
 
There is no significant difference in perspectives between Executive / Senior IT 
Administration and lower-level IT personal regarding the security systems and 
other related issues; hence both groups view it equally as an important issue. The 
mean for both groups are very close, as illustrated in table 3-6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cyber Security, Threat Intelligence                Emmanuel U Opara et al 
©International Information Management Association, Inc. 2017  144 ISSN: 1543-5962-Printed Copy  ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy 
Table 3. Case Processing Summary 
  
 
Cases 
Included Excluded Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Administration* 
Gender 
243 97.6% 6 2.4% 249 100.0% 
 
 
Table 4. Administration Mean  
Gender N Mean Std. Deviation 
Male 166 1.4277 .49624 
Female 77 1.5325 .50222 
Total 243 1.4609 .49950 
 
 
Table 5.  T- Test Group Statistics 
 
Gender N Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Administration Male 
166 1.4277 .49624 .03852 
Female 
77 1.5325 .50222 .05723 
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Table 6.- Part I: Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
Administration Equal variances 
assumed .129 -.10476 .06868 
Equal variances not 
assumed .131 -.10476 .06899 
 
 
Table 6.- Part II: Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Administration Equal variances assumed -.24005 .03054 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-.24109 .03158 
 
 
SECURITY 
 
The first hypothesis tests whether male and females have differences in 
perspective regarding the security of company network. The mean for both 
gender groups are very close. 
 
HO: There is no difference between male and female perspectives regarding the 
security of company network. 
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Ha: There is a difference between male and female perspectives regarding the 
security of company network, as illustrated in table 7-10. 
 
 
Table 7. Security 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Somehow 
Secured 
33 13.3 13.5 13.5 
Secured 160 64.3 65.6 79.1 
Very Secured 51 20.5 20.9 100.0 
Total 244 98.0 100.0  
Missing System 5 2.0   
Total 249 100.0   
 
 
Table 8. Means Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Included Excluded Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Security* 
Gender 
244 98.0% 5 2.0% 249 100.0% 
 
 
Table 9.  T-Test Group Statistics 
 
Gender N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Security Male 167 4.1078 .60150 .04655 
Female 77 4.0000 .53803 .06131 
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Table 10.  Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Upper 
Security Equal variances assumed .26579 
Equal variances not assumed .25978 
 
 
EFFECTIVENESS 
 
The second hypothesis tests whether male and females have differences in 
perspective regarding the effectiveness of network security systems of the 
organization. The mean for both gender groups are very close. 
HO: There is no difference between male and female perspectives regarding the 
effectiveness of network security systems of the organization. 
Ha: There is a difference between male and female perspectives regarding the 
effectiveness of network security systems of the organization, as illustrated below 
in table 11-14. 
 
Table 11. Effectiveness 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Undecided 36 14.5 14.8 14.8 
Agree 143 57.4 58.6 73.4 
Strongly 
Agree 
65 26.1 26.6 100.0 
Total 244 98.0 100.0  
Missing System 5 2.0   
Total 249 100.0   
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Table 12.  Mean Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Included Excluded Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Effectiveness* 
Gender 
244 98.0% 5 2.0% 249 100.0% 
 
 
Table 13.  T-Test Group Statistics 
 
Gender N Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Effectiveness Male 167 4.1138 .64396 .04983 
Female 77 4.1299 .61453 .07003 
 
 
Table 14. Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Effectiveness Equal variances assumed -.18836 .15617 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-.18589 .15370 
 
 
IDS 
 
The third hypothesis tests whether male and females have differences in 
perspective regarding the investment of more money in intrusion detection 
systems [IDS] in 2015-2016. The mean for both gender groups are very close. 
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HO: There is no difference between male and female perspectives regarding the 
investment of more money in intrusion detection systems [IDS] in 2015-2016. 
 
Ha: There is a difference between male and female perspectives regarding the 
investment of more money in intrusion detection systems [IDS] in 2015-2016, as 
illustrated below in table 15-18. 
 
Table 15. IDS 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly 
Disagree 
3 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Disagree 10 4.0 4.1 5.3 
Undecided 46 18.5 18.9 24.2 
Agree 136 54.6 55.7 79.9 
Strongly Agree 49 19.7 20.1 100.0 
Total 244 98.0 100.0  
Missing System 5 2.0   
Total 249 100.0   
 
Table 16. Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Included Excluded Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
IDS  * 
Gender 
244 98.0% 5 2.0% 249 100.0% 
 
Table 17.  T-Test Group Statistics 
 Gender N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
IDS Male 167 3.9581 .77889 .06027 
Female 77 3.7532 .86078 .09810 
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Table 18.  Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Upper 
IDS Equal variances assumed .42340 
Equal variances not assumed .43253 
 
 
HACKERS 
 
The fourth hypothesis tests whether male and females have differences in 
perspective regarding hacker’s issue. The mean for both gender groups are very 
close. 
 
HO: There is no difference between male and female perspectives regarding 
hacker’s issue. 
 
Ha: There is a difference between male and female perspectives regarding 
hacker’s issue, as illustrated below in table 18-21. 
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Table 18.  Hackers 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Somewhat 
Concern 
29 11.6 11.8 11.8 
Moderately 
Concern 
132 53.0 53.9 65.7 
Extremely 
Concern 
84 33.7 34.3 100.0 
Total 245 98.4 100.0  
Missing System 4 1.6   
Total 249 100.0   
 
 
 
Table 19.  Mean Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Included Excluded Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Hackers  * 
Gender 
245 98.4% 4 1.6% 249 100.0% 
 
 
Table 20. T- Test Group Statistics 
 
Gender N Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Hackers Male 168 4.2560 .63808 .04923 
Female 77 4.1558 .65020 .07410 
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Table 21.  Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Upper 
Hackers Equal variances assumed .27411 
Equal variances not assumed .27593 
  
 
EMPLOYEES 
 
The fifth hypothesis tests whether male and females that pose the greatest 
network security concerns/threats to the organization. The mean for both gender 
groups are very close. 
 
HO: There is no difference between male and female employees that pose the 
greatest network security concerns/threats to the organization. 
 
Ha: There is a difference between male and female employees that pose the 
greatest network security concerns/threats to the organization, as illustrated 
below in table 21-24. 
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Table 21.  Employees 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Not at all Concern 1 .4 .4 .4 
Seldom Concern 9 3.6 3.7 4.1 
Somewhat 
Concern 
55 22.1 22.4 26.5 
Moderately 
Concern 
117 47.0 47.8 74.3 
Extremely 
Concern 
63 25.3 25.7 100.0 
Total 245 98.4 100.0  
Missing System 4 1.6   
Total 249 100.0   
 
 
Table 22.  Mean Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Included Excluded Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Employees  * 
Gender 
245 98.4% 4 1.6% 249 100.0% 
 
 
Table 23. T-Test Group Statistics 
 
Gender N Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Employees Male 168 4.0000 .81894 .06318 
Female 77 3.8312 .80136 .09132 
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Table 24. Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Employees Equal variances assumed -.05169 .38935 
Equal variances not assumed -.05059 .38825 
 
 
FOREIGN 
 
HO: There is no difference between male and female of foreign state that pose the 
greatest network security concerns/threats to the organization. 
 
Ha: There is a difference between male and female of foreign states that pose the 
greatest network security concerns/threats to the organization. 
 
The sixth hypothesis tests whether male and females of foreign state that pose the 
greatest network security concerns/threats to the organization. The mean for both 
gender groups are very close, as illustrated below in table 24-27. 
 
 
Table 24.  Foreign 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Somewhat 
Concern 
26 10.4 10.6 10.6 
Moderately 
Concern 
124 49.8 50.6 61.2 
Extremely 
Concern 
95 38.2 38.8 100.0 
Total 245 98.4 100.0  
Missing System 4 1.6   
Total 249 100.0   
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Table 25. Mean Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Included Excluded Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Foreign  * 
Gender 
245 98.4% 4 1.6% 249 100.0% 
 
 
Table 26. T-Test  Group Statistics 
 Gender N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Foreign Male 168 4.2976 .64334 .04963 
Female 77 4.2468 .65204 .07431 
 
 
Table 27.  Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Upper 
Foreign Equal variances assumed .22600 
Equal variances not assumed .22747 
 
 
VENDORS 
 
HO: There is no difference between male and female of third party contractors-
vendors that pose the greatest network security concerns/threats to the 
organization. 
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Ha: There is a difference between male and female of third party contractors-
vendors that pose the greatest network security concerns/threats to the 
organization. 
 
The seventh hypothesis tests whether male and females of third party contractors-
vendors that pose the greatest network security concerns/threats to the 
organization. The mean for both gender groups are very close, as illustrated 
below in table 27-31. 
 
Table 28. Vendors 
 Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Seldom Concern 3 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Somewhat 
Concern 
50 20.1 20.4 21.6 
Moderately 
Concern 
149 59.8 60.8 82.4 
Extremely 
Concern 
43 17.3 17.6 100.0 
Total 245 98.4 100.0  
Missing System 4 1.6   
Total 249 100.0   
 
 
Table 29. Mean Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Included Excluded Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Vendors  * 
Gender 
245 98.4% 4 1.6% 249 100.0% 
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Table 30. T-Test Group Statistics 
 
Gender N Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Vendors Male 168 3.9821 .65179 .05029 
Female 77 3.8701 .65596 .07475 
 
 
Table 31.   Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Upper 
Vendors Equal variances assumed .28905 
Equal variances not assumed .29006 
 
 
SUMMARY OF THE HYPOTHESIS 
 
A total of 7 hypotheses were analyzed using SPSS software. Independent samples 
t tests were also used since the F test for testing equality of variance in any given 
pair of samples was not significant. 
 
All seven hypotheses were examined with respect to gender. In all of the 
hypotheses, namely administrator, security, effectiveness, IDS, hackers, 
employees, foreign nation states, and vendors, both females and males did not 
differ significantly in their perspectives regarding the seven hypotheses as the 
mean values for both genders was very close. Hence, they agree on the parameters 
of the survey, given the values of the means of their responses. 
 
 
OVERALL CONCLUSION 
 
Security professional should be equipped with mitigation tools and knowledge 
that enhances their power over adversaries since awareness of specific 
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circumstances that give rise to vulnerabilities allow security practitioners to 
address the root causes of a given breach.   
 
As the study found, threats from sophisticated malware will continue to rise as 
attacks on organizations escalates.  Majority of the IT staff in the study agree that 
security teams can no longer afford to wait for attacks to occur instead, they need 
to implement a dynamic adaptive defense approach that search and eliminate 
unseen exploits. After a breach, the most important step for security 
administrators is to identify the root cause of a breach.  This can be achieved by 
utilizing forensic to analyze traffic by finding the root cause of an event. These 
could include data capture, storing all packets for post-incident for forensic 
analysis, combing through captured traffic for anomalies and signs of problems in 
the network and logging results of investigations and network vulnerabilities for 
post mortem mitigation. 
 
Shielding against anomalies requires the use of security technologies that leverage 
techniques other than blacklisting.  Mitigating against these types of attack requires 
IT security professionals to rely on a defense-in-depth strategy that utilizes real-
time, signature-less detection mechanisms to proactively respond on potential 
threats. 
 
Security professional seeking to build secure networks may use the Cyber Kill chain 
process as an added tool to understand the nature and methodologies of their 
adversaries. 
 
The best method of dealing with polymorphic malware is to employ multiple and 
diverse blocking, filtering, detection and removal programs. These programs should 
be kept current and should be run as often as possible. Auto-protect features, if 
available, should be enabled. 
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